Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 17
Issue 1 Symposium - The Changing Face of
Copyright Law: Resolving the Disconnect
Between 20th Century Laws and 21st Century
Attitudes

Article 9

October 2009

Why Coca-Cola's Fictional Lawsuit Against Coke Zero for Taste
Infringement is a Losing Battle
Jessica Nicole Cox
University of Georgia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jessica N. Cox, Why Coca-Cola's Fictional Lawsuit Against Coke Zero for Taste Infringement is a Losing
Battle, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 121 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol17/iss1/9

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Cox: Why Coca-Cola's Fictional Lawsuit Against Coke Zero for Taste Inf

NOTES
WHY COCA-COLA'S FICTIONAL LAWSUIT
AGAINST COKE ZERO FOR TASTE
INFRINGEMENT IS A LOSING BATTLE
JessicaNicole Cox *
TABLE OF CONTENTS

122

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

BACKGROUND ............................................
123
A. TRADEMARK PROTECTION GENERALLY .....................
124
B. PROTECTION EXTENDED TO NONTRADITIONAL
TRADEMARKS .......................................... 125
C. FLAVOR PROTECTION ATTEMPTED, BUT DENIED ..............
129
D. COCA-COLA'S PATH TO PROTECTION ........................
130

1.
2.
3.
4.

...........................................

Source Indication and Seconday Meaning .....................
FuncionaliyDoctine ...................................
Likelihood of Confusion ..................................
GraphicalRequirement ...................................

131
132
135
137

III. ANALYSIS .................................................
A. SOURCE INDICATION AND SECONDARY MEANING .............
B. FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE ...............................
C. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION ..............................
D. GRAPHICAL REQUIREMENT ...............................
E. TASTE MARK CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ........

138

IV . CONCLUSION

145

.............................................

139
140
142
144
145

J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Georgia School of Law. The author would like to thank
Professor David E. Shipley, ProfessorJoseph Miller, and my fellowJournalmembersfor their help
in creating and editing this Note. Additionally, many thanks to family and friends for their love and
support throughout this process.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2009

1

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 9
J. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 17:121

I. INTRODUCTION

PHIL ROSE (Actor posing as a Coca-Cola Senior Brand Manager):
"Do you think that we, as the Coke brand, would have a case
against the Coke Zero brand ... for taste infringement? (Silence.
No response.) What's your specialty?"
LAWYER (Actual attorney who has no idea any of this is fake): "I
am in real estate law."
PHIL ROSE: "Perfect. Let's say this is a property. (Points toward
the Coca-Cola can.) Architectural. It's been made a landmark.
Next door somebody buys the lot and builds an eeriy similar house.
What can we do there? Let's put on the lawyer pants and walk
down that path."'
In 2007, the Coca-Cola brand launched a marketing campaign based on an
imaginary lawsuit for "taste infringement. ' 2 The advertisements jokingly posit
that "Coke Zero stole the taste of Coke" and potential "victim[s] of taste
confusion" are encouraged to seek legal representation.3 The premise of taste
infringement, as stated by one attorney on hidden camera, is "the possibility that
consumers will start drinking [Coke Zero] thinking they are drinking [CocaCola]." 4 The advertising campaign produced numerous viral video commercials
and a website'
Although these advertisements are intended as a joke to highlight how similar
Coke Zero's taste is to that of Coca-Cola, the idea of taste infringement might
have a plausible legal basis. Product color, sound, shape, and scent have each
been afforded legal protection as nontraditional trademarks.6 With the

' Coke v. Coke Zero clip, http://www.youtube.com/watchV=PIOoODSnKoU (last visited
Oct. 3, 2009) (on file with author).
2 Stuart Elliott, Can't Tell Your CokesApart?Sue Someone, N.Y. TMES, Mar. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.nydmes.com/2007/03/05/business/media/O5adcol.html.
3 Id.

' Janet Conley, FrivolousLifigation:How Coke Punk 'd'ItsLauyers,FULTON COUNTYDAILY REP.,
Mar. 26, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1174640633108 (view first
commercial video clip featuring Michael J. Kline).
' See Elliott, supra note 2 (stating the advertising campaign "relies largely on new-media efforts
like e-mail marketing, video clips posted to websites, and digital banner advertising").
6 SeeIn re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (extending trademark
protection to the color pink of "fibrous glass residential insulation'D; MGM/UA Entm't Co., Fed.
TM Reg. No. 1395550 (filed Aug. 15, 1985) (extending trademark protection for the sound of a lion
roaring); Hershey Chocolate & Confectionary Corp., Fed. TM Reg. No. 0186828 (filedJan. 17,1924)
(extending trademark protection for the shape of a wrapped Hershey's Kiss candy with an attached
paper tag); In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (TT.A.B. 1990) (extending trademark protection for the
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broadening scope of trademark coverage for non-visual marks, it seems inevitable
that the boundaries of trademark law will be challenged in the coming years,
possibly to the point of protecting product taste.
The Coca-Cola Company is the largest beverage producer in the world.7 The
corporation's namesake beverage, Coca-Cola Classic (Coca-Cola), is a unique
product with a distinct flavor. Over the years, consumers have been subjected to
taste tests involving Coca-Cola to determine whether it is the premier cola
beverage.8 If trademark status is extended to the flavor of Coca-Cola, a "taste
infringement" lawsuit against other cola beverages could become a legal reality.
Trademark protection for the flavor of a cola beverage is only possible if
Coca-Cola can (1) demonstrate source indication or secondary meaning in the
flavor and (2) prove that the flavor is not functional. This Note explains why
Coca-Cola will not be able to protect its unique flavor through trademark law.
Part II of this Note chronicles the development of trademark law and the broad
scope of protection awarded to a variety of nontraditional trademarks. Previous
attempts to trademark flavor, each unsuccessful, are discussed. Trademark
doctrines, including source indication, functionality, likelihood of confusion, and
graphical depiction are discussed in relation to protection of a beverage taste.
Part III of this Note analyzes whether Coca-Cola's unique flavor can satisfy
the requirements for trademark protection. Practical considerations for extending
trademark protection to cover product taste are also addressed. Ultimately, this
Note concludes that Coca-Cola most likely cannot secure trademark protection
for its unique flavor because of the functionality doctrine and the difficulties
encountered with registration and enforcement of such a nontraditional
trademark.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part begins by addressing the foundations and purposes of trademark
protection. Next, nontraditional trademarks are discussed, including the various
types of visual and non-visual marks acknowledged in the United States, and the
particular troubles with registering them. Finally, the requirements to trademark
unique flavors are discussed, along with the likelihood of success in an
infringement action.

Plumeria scent of sewing thread).
Parija B. Kavilanz, Coca-Cola Posts Higher Profit, Sales, CNNMoNEY.CoM, Oct. 17, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/17/news/companies/coke/index.htm.
' See Pepsi Challenge, http://www.pepsiusa.com (click "Ads & More" and select "Pepsi
Legacy"; then click through to slide 8/15) (last visited Sept. 6, 2009) (describing the "Pepsi
Challenge" as a marketing promotion to have consumers participate in a blind taste test of CocaCola and Pepsi Cola to determine which beverage is America's favorite).
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A. TRADEMARK PROTECTION GENERALLY

Trademark law in the United States is rooted in the Trademark Act of 1946,
also known as the Lanham Act.9 The Lanham Act grants national protection for
trademarks and provides a federal cause of action for infringement.'0 In addition
to the federal statute, individual states create and enforce trademark law, creating
a dual system of regulation."
Trademark protection frequently coincides with formal registration of a mark.
Actual or constructive use of the trademark in interstate commerce, not
registration with the government, triggers protection of the mark.' Registration,
though not required, is beneficial because it protects the owner's interest by
providing constructive notice of ownership to all would-be infringers. 3
Additionally, registration creates a rebuttable presumption of validity, shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant in an infringement action. 4
Trademark law is intended to provide the mark owner profits generated by his
good reputation and increase consumer confidence by eliminating confusion
about the product's origin.'" The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
trademarks assist consumers in identifying the item which they wish to purchase
based on the past experiences with that particular brand.'6 Therefore, trademarks
reduce the costs of decision-making in the marketplace and promote efficiency.
The trademark owner is protected against lost sales that occur when consumers
purchase infringing products mistakenly believing they have purchased the mark
owner's products.'" This concept is generally known as passing off or palming
9
off.'

9 TrademarkAct of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1072,1091-1096,1111-1129,1141
(2002).
1o

i

See id.§ 1114 (detailing remedies available to owners of infringed trademarks).
3J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:1

(4th ed. 2009).
12 In re Int'l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
13 74 AM.JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 68 (2009).
'4 Franek v. Walmart Stores, Inc., Nos. 08-CV-0058, 08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009) (citing Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 472 F.
Supp. 2d 999, 1011-12 (N.D. 11. 2007)).
1s S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), rprintedin1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274-75.
16 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
17 Id
18 See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 335-36 (1938)

(awarding damages upon a finding of unfair competition when a competitor used the plaintiff's
registered 'Nu-Enamel' trademark on a competing product).
19 Id
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Trademark law also creates incentives for individuals and corporations to
invest in their brand names and logos. Specifically, potential infringers are
prevented from misappropriating the benefits of the mark holder's labor and
from causing reputational harm to the mark holder.2' Trademark protection is
expansive, with the potential to endure forever if the mark remains valid and is
renewed in perpetuity.2
B.

PROTECTION EXTENDED TO NONTRADITIONAL TRADEMARKS

Before the Lanham Act, protection for nontraditional marks was rooted in the
principle of unfair competition, rather than trademark law.22 In Yellow Cab Transit
Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Tran er Co., the color yellow for a taxicab vehicle
received protection after a businessman imported the concept from Europe to
Chicago.'
Because the color and design schemes for the vehicles of both
companies were substantially similar, confusion resulted among consumers and
injunctive relief was necessary to prevent one company from profiting off the
goodwill of a competitor.24 Although the Sixth Circuit refused to go so far as to
grant appellant the exclusive right to use the color yellow, unfair competition law
5
laid the foundation for the legal protection of nontraditional trademarks.
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof.., used by a person.., to identify and distinguish
his or her goods.. ..
,,2 Nontraditional trademarks are generally defined as those
marks which go beyond ordinary, two dimensional marks. 27 The preamble of the
Lanham Act provides a basis for expanding traditional trademark protection to
include nontraditional marks: "No trademark... shall be refused registration on

'o Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trade-mark only gives the right to
prohibit the use of itso far as to protect the owner's goodwill against the sale of another's product

as his.").
11 Quaktex, 514 U.S. at 165.
'2 In m Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (extending
trademark protection to the color pink of "fibrous glass residential insulation" while also noting that
early courts granted protection to color marks to prevent unfair competition if the owner could show
secondary meaning of the mark); see aLro Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., 512 F. Supp. 1184,1186 (W.D.
Pa. 1981) (applying the standard of unfair competition to "the manufacture and sale of plain,
unmarked color-coded shims, gasket shim stock and spacers").
2 147 F.2d 407, 415 (6th Cir. 1945).
24Id.at 414.
25Id.at 415.
26 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
' SeeJerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, CinnamonBuns, MarrhingDucks andCheny-Scented
Racecar Exhaust Protecing NontraditionalTrademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773, 773-74 (2005)

(classifying product packaging, scent, sound, color, and taste as nontraditional trademarks).
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The guidance provided in

the preamble to the Lanham Act and the broad statutory definition of
"trademark" have paved the way for the protection of color, sound, shape, and
smell. 29 As one tribunal noted, the Lanham Act30 "essentially encompass[es]
nontraditional trademarks by not excluding them."
One of the oldest recognized nontraditional trademarks is the sound mark.3
National Broadcasting Company, Inc. acquired trademark protection for its
unique chime consisting of tones G-E-C in the key of C.32 The mark was first
registered for radio as a service mark, and later re-registered for use on
television.33 Other notable sound marks include the Pillsbury Doughboy's
giggle," the quack of the AFLAC duck,35 the familiar "ho, ho, ho" of the Jolly
Green Giant,3 6 the MGM lion's roar, 37 and the Harlem Globetrotters' theme
song.3 8 Musical compositions are also eligible for trademark protection.39
Trademark protection for sound has encountered some opposition. 4° For
example, Harley-Davidson, Inc. filed an application to protect the "exhaust sound
of ... [its] motorcycles, produced by V-Twin, common crankpin motorcycle
engines when the goods are in use. 41 In response, many attorneys and
competitors urged the rejection of the mark fearing it would create an unfair
monopoly. 42 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
nonetheless granted the application and nine competitors filed opposition to the

15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006).
29See supra note 6 (describing various trademarks rooted in color, sound, shape, and smell).
0 In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639, 1644 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (refusing trademark
registration for the orange flavor of an anti-depressant tablet because the flavor is functional).
31 Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 27, at 802.
32 Fed. TM Reg. No. 0916522 (filed Jan. 23, 1970).
31 Fed. TM Reg. No. 0523616 (filed Nov. 20, 1947) (expired on Apr. 4, 1990).
3 Fed. TM Reg. No. 2692077 (filed Nov. 10, 2000).
3 Fed. TM Reg.
Fed. TM Reg.
37 Fed. TM Reg.
31 Fed. TM Reg.
39 See Oliveira v.

No. 2607415 (filed Aug. 30, 2001).
No. 2519203 (filed Oct. 12, 1999) (cancelled Oct. 28, 2008).
No. 139550 (filed Aug. 15, 1985).
No. 1700895 (filed Apr. 19, 1991).
Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2001) ("We can see no reason why a
musical composition should be ineligible to serve as a symbol or device to identify a person's goods
or services.").
4 See Michael B. Sapherstein, The TrademarkRegistrabiih ofthe Harley-DavidsonRoar A Multimedia
Analysis, 1998 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F.101101, *10 (quoting Honda's notice of opposition
to Harley-Davidson's attempt at protecting its engine roar, which read "[i]t's very difficult to imagine
a world where the sound of a running engine is an exclusive property right").
41 Id at *4.
42 See id at *10 ("There was found to be no company or commentator, other than those on
Harley's payroll, who supported the grant of Harley's trademark.').
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mark.43 After more than six years of litigation, Harley-Davidson abandoned the
application leaving the engine sound unprotected."
There are a number of difficulties involved in successful registration of a
sound mark. A sound cannot be graphically represented as easily as a word
mark.45 The USPTO does, however, maintain digital files of registered sounds in
its database.' Additionally, the English language limits the ability to represent a
sound on paper because there are a finite number of words available to describe
a specific noise.47 Enforcing a sound mark in an infringement action presents
substantial obstacles, but is not impossible.
A shape mark, or a three-dimensional mark, typically applies to the shape of
the product itself or its packaging.48 The triangular shape of a chemical cake was
afforded trademark protection by the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA) in In re Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.49 The shape
adopted by the applicant was arbitrary and chosen to indicate the origin of the
good to the consumer.5" The CCPA noted that when the shape or feature of a
product is arbitrary, there is "no public interest to be protected" that would
preclude trademark status."'
If the shape of a product is a functional feature of an ornamental design to
enhance the appearance, it should be protected by a utility or design patent rather
than a trademark.5 2 Although design patents can be filed on the same subject
matter as trademarks, the two regimes offer different protections and have
varying requirements for protection. 3 A design patent lasts for fourteen years,
while trademark protection has the potential to endure forever.' Additionally,

43 id.

supra note 11, § 7:104.
See In mvGeneral Electric Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560,563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) ("Unlike the case
of a trademark which is applied to the goods in such a manner as to create a visual and lasting
impression upon a purchaser or prospective purchaser encountering the mark in the marketplace,
a sound mark depends upon aural perception of the listener which may be as fleeting as the sound
itself....').
4' See USPTO Soundex, http://www.uspto.gov/go/kids/kidsound.html (last visited Sept. 19,
44 1 MCCARTHY,
41

2009).
7 Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 27, at 776 ("Unlike word marks, some nontraditional marks
may be difficult to describe with precision and may for that reason alone face enforcement
problems.").

Id. at 808.
335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964). See also In reMogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925
(C.C.P.A. 1964) (granting trademark protection for the distinctive shape of a wine decanter).
'o Minnesota Mining, 335 F.2d at 839-40.
51 Id at 840.
52 1 McCARTHY, supra note 11, § 6:6.
53 Id. 6:3.
s Gilson & LaLonde, sapra note 27, at 809-10.
48
4
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'5
design patents require the product feature to be "new and non-obvious,"
compared to trademark requirements of source indication, nonfunctionality, and
no likelihood of confusion. 6
A third type of nontraditional trademark is the color mark, which usually
consists of a single color associated with a commercial product.5 7 InQualitex Co.
v.JacobsonProductsCo., the Supreme Court stated that product color fits within the
regulatory scheme of the Lanham Act and could be protected as a trademark."8
Trademark protection was awarded to the green-gold color of a manufacturer's
dry cleaning press pad. 9 Consumers' reliance on the green-gold color to identify
the
the source of the dry cleaning pad was an important consideration 6for
°
Supreme Court and the driving factor in awarding trademark protection.
One mechanism used for the trademark protection of color is the PANTONE
Color System.61 This commercial color classification system uses numbers to
identify specific shades of color. 6' Thousands of colors are identified in the
PANTONE system. 63 The PANTONE Color System was utilized by the United
Parcel Service to describe its signature brown color in an application for federal
trademark registration. 64 The development of the PANTONE process has
brought concreteness to the use and protection of color marks.65
The final category of nontraditional trademark is the scent mark.66 Scents can
be registered as trademarks if a sufficient amount of evidence can be produced to
show that the scent can function as a trademark.67 Sewing thread and embroidery
yarn smelling of a "high impact, fresh, floral fragrance reminiscent of Plumeria

5- 1 MCCARTHY,

supra note 11, § 6:6.
'sId § 3:3.
57 Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 27, at 777.
58 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995); see also In reOwens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1122
(Fed. Cit. 1985) (approving trademark status for the color pink of fibrous glass residential insulation).
s9Quaktex, 514 U.S. at 159.
o Id.at 166.

61 Gilson & LaLonde,
62 Id at 778.

supra note 27, at 776.

63 PANTONE, http://www.pantone.com (click "about us" and select "what we do") (last
visited Sept. 19, 2009).
6'Gilson & LaLonde, spra note 27, at 778 (noting United Parcel Service registered "the color
chocolate brown, which is the approximate equivalent of PANTONE 462C" for its fleet of service
vehicles and uniforms).
65 See id at 779 ("The PANTONE System is a useful day-to-day tool for the trademark lawyer
for making color comparisons between two products or logos.').
6 See, e.g., Mike Mantel d/b/a Manhattan Oil, Fed. TM Reg. Nos. 2463044 (filed Aug. 25,1995)
(cherry scent), 2568512 (filed Sept. 19, 1997) (grape scent), and 2596156 (filed Sept. 19, 1997)
(strawberry scent) (granting trademark status for the fruity scents of motor lubricants and fuels).
67 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11,

§ 7:106.
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blossoms" received trademark protection in In re Clarke.68 The Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (fTAB) analogized scent to color in the absence of any
nonfunctional scent precedent.69 Scent was determined to be capable of
identifying -and distinguishing products, which would qualify it for trademark
protection. The TTAB emphasized that the Plumeria fragrance was "not an
inherent attribute or natural characteristic of applicant's goods but is rather a
feature supplied by applicant."71
Scent marks are similar to flavor marks because scent and taste perceptions are
subjective and unique to each individual.72 Although both marks are completely
non-visual, a detailed written description is required for registration. 3 To remedy
the troubling aspects of extending trademark protection to scent, a variety of
mechanisms have been developed to foster objectivity, including "electronic
nose" technology.7 4 Additionally, spectrograms, oscillograms, and spectrums can
provide more certainty by depicting scents in an objective, visual manner."
C. FLAVOR PROTECTION ATTEMPTED, BUT DENIED

A pharmaceutical company recently filed a pioneering trademark application
for the flavor of a product. On June 14,2006, the TTAB refused registration of
a mark for the "orange flavor" of a quick-dissolving antidepressant tablet.7 6 The
TTAB determined that the "orange flavor" could not act as a trademark.77
The examining attorney denied the registration because (1) "orange flavor" did
not identify or distinguish the applicant's goods from others, and (2) the flavor
was functional, precluding protection under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5).7 s The TTAB

17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
Id.at 1239.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1240.
72 See Douglas D. Churovich, Scents, Sense or Cents?; Something Stinks in the Lanbam Act,20 ST.
68
69

LOUIs U. PUB. L. REv. 293, 302-04 (stating an individual's perception of scent is largely subjective
and unique to that person); Nancy L. Clarke, Note, Issues in the FederalRegistration of Flavors as
TrademarksforPharmaceuticalProducts, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 105, 131 (1993) ("A flavor's subjectivity
derives principally from its complexity.").
73 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (2009).
74 See Church & Dwight Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 893, 896 (D.N.J. 1994)
(describing S.C. Johnson's product tests using an electronic nose); Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 27,
at 800 (discussing the use of an electronic nose in securing trademark registration for a scent).
" Kevin K McCormick, 'Ving" You are Now Free to Register that Sound, 96 TRADEMARK
REP. 1101, 1111 n.51 (2006).
76 In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639, 1651 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
77 Id.
78 Id.at 1640.
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noted that many oral pharmaceutical products carry an orange flavor including
"cough drops, vitamins, and herbal medications," thus applicant's mark was not
sufficiently distinctive to warrant protection.7 9 Additionally, the orange flavor was
protection because it was added to make
functional and ineligible for trademark
80
the medicine more palatable.
Similarly, in 2000 another pharmaceutical company attempted to trademark
the "taste of artificial strawberry flavour" for use in its pharmaceutical products
in Europe.8 1 Since the creation of the European Union, trademark law in Europe
has steadily developed into a uniform body of law with "striking structural
similarities"8' 2 to the United States system. 3 The Office of Harmonization in the
Internal Market (OHIM) is the European equivalent of the USPTO, responsible
4
for registering trademarks for the European Union member countries.8
OHIM denied the pharmaceutical company's application for two reasons: (1)
the mark lacked distinctive character, and (2) the mark was not sufficiently precise
to satisfy the graphical representation requirement.85 The OHIM Board of
Appeals noted that awarding the mark to the pharmaceutical company would
hinder its competitors in the marketplace.8 6 The OHIM Board of Appeals
strongly believed the "taste of artificial strawberries" could not adequately
distinguish applicant's pharmaceutical products from one of its competitor's. 7
Both gustatory applications for trademark protection were denied because of
their generic descriptions and the functionality of the flavors. The orange and
strawberry flavors used in the pharmaceutical products were intended to mask the
unpleasant taste of the other ingredients. These decisions leave open the question
ofwhether a non-pharmaceutical product could successfully secure protection for
a taste mark.
D. COCA-COLA'S PATH TO PROTECTION

This Part discusses three requirements for securing trademark protection and
one additional requirement for official registration of a trademark: (1) the flavor

79 Id at 1643-50.
80Id. at 1645.
81 OHIM decision Second Board of Appeal, R120/2001-2 (Aug. 4,2003).
82

David Vaver, Recent Trends in European Trademark Law: Of Shape, Senses and Sensation, 95

TRADEMARK REP. 895, 896 (2005).
83 See id. at 895 ('The tendency [in European trademark cases] ...is to expand protection,
although in a less pronounced way than in the United States.").
84 OHIM, http://oami.europa.eu (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
8s OHIM decision Second Board of Appeal, R120/2001-2 (Aug. 4,2003).
86 Id

' Kirsten Toft, EC: Trade Marks - Taste Mark, 26 EuR. INTELL PROP. REV. 17,17 (2004).
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has acquired secondary meaning, and so acts as a source indicator,8 8 (2) the flavor
is not functional, 9 (3) there is a likelihood of consumer confusion if the flavor is
not given protection, 90 (4) and the flavor can be represented in a written
description. 9'
1. Source Indication and Secondary Meaning. The first hurdle to obtaining
trademark protection is demonstrating a flavor's ability to indicate the source of
the product. 9 The Supreme Court created a framework for determining a
product's indication of source: "An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of
being protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired
distinctiveness through secondary meaning." 93
The flavor must indicate the origin of the product and not the product itself.94
The Supreme Court has determined that some types of nontraditional trademarks
are virtually incapable of being inherently distinctive. For example, the Court
acknowledged that "a product's color is unlike 'fanciful,' 'arbitrary,' or 'suggestive'
words or designs, which almost automaticaly tell a customer that they refer to a
brand."95
In the current framework, a taste mark protected as a nontraditional trademark
must demonstrate "secondary meaning."96 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition defines "secondary meaning" as being achieved when a mark is
"uniquely associated with a particular source."97 The Supreme Court has stated
secondary meaning is acquired when, "in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a product feature... is to identify the source of the product rather
than the product itself." 98 Under this formulation, an applicant attempting to

8

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) ("The term trademark includes any word, name, symbol, or

device... to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.").
'9 See id S 1052(e)(5) ("No trademark . . . shall be refused registration . .. unless it . . . is
functional.").
'0 See id. § 1052(d) ("No trademark.., shall be refused by registration... unless it... [c]onsists
of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office...
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.').
9 See id § 1051 (a)(2) ("The application shall include ... a drawing of the mark.").
92 1 MCCARTHY, supranote 11, §
3:1.
9' Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
" See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (denying trademark protection
for the term "shredded wheat" because "the plaintiff must show more than a subordinate meaning
which applies to it. It must show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the
consuming public is not the product but the producer.'.
9' Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995) (extending trademark
protection for the green-gold color of a dry cleaning press pad).
96 See id at 163 (stating that trademark protection requires consumers to use the mark to identify
and distinguish the source of specific goods).
9' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995).
9 Qua'tex, 514 U.S. at 163 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851
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secure trademark protection for a flavor must demonstrate that the flavor serves
only to indicate who produced the good, rather than the good itself.99
Secondary meaning can be demonstrated in a variety of ways, including the
length of time the mark has been in use, advertising expenditures, volume of sales,
and professional opinions within the trade. 1 For example, in securing trademark
protection for its signature pink-colored housing insulation, Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corporation proffered evidence of forty-two million dollars expended
for advertising and 50% customer recognition of its product to demonstrate
secondary meaning.' Although these factors standing alone do not necessarily
demonstrate that the mark indicates the source
of the good, each provides
02
substantial evidence of secondary meaning.'
2. Functionaliy Doctrine. The most substantial barrier to establishing a taste
mark under the current trademark system is the functionality doctrine." 3 Over
the past century, a combination of "case law, restatement, and commentary"
confirms that trademark protection will not be extended to any functional aspect
of a good."0 Congress codified this principle stating "[n]o trademark... shall be
refused registration... on account of its nature unless it... [c]onsists of a mark
which... as a whole, is functional."' 0' The patent system, not the trademark
06
regime, is the appropriate vehicle for protecting functional product features.'
One commentator has emphasized that trademark law cannot "properly make an
'end run' around the strict requirements of utility patent law by giving equivalent
rights to exclude."'

7

By preventing trademark protection for functional aspects

n.11 (1982)).
99 See Susie Middlemiss & Carina Badger, Nqoping Taste Marks in the Bud, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REv. 152,153 (2004) ("The essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin
of the marked product or service .... " (emphasis added)).
100 See In re Hollywood Brands, Inc., 214 F.2d 139, 141 (C.C.P.A. 1954) (providing "forty-two
form affidavits" from individuals involved in the candy trade, along with sales volume and
advertising expenditures to establish secondary meaning); Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods
Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (presenting sales volume evidence in an attempt to
establish secondary meaning).
10' In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing In re
Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
102 Seabrook, 568 F.2d at 1345.
103 See Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 27, at 800 ("One substantial impediment to enforcement
of flavor marks is functionality.").
104 Harold R. Weinberg, TrademarkLaw, FunctionalDesign Features,and the Trouble with TraJFix, 9
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 9 (2001).
10s 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006).
106 Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Ci. 1995).
107 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 7:64.
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of a product, competition is promoted because the limited number of design
configurations will not be exhausted."°8
Defining an aspect of a good as "functional" is a complex, difficult task for
courts to undertake 3 9 Early in trademark jurisprudence, some courts equated
"functional" with "essential.""'
An alternate standard later put forth by the
Restatement of Torts is that a feature is functional if "it affects .. .purpose,
action or performance, or the facility or economy of processing, handling or us [e]
[of the good].'1
The Supreme Court adopted its own standard in Inwood Laboratories,Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories,Inc., stating that "a product feature is functional if it is essential to the
use or purpose of the article or it affects the cost or quality of the article.""' 2 Two
types of functionality are recognized from the Inwood formulation: (1) utilitarian
functionality and (2) aesthetic functionality."' A design feature falls under
' 4
utilitarian functionality if "it is essential to the use or purpose of the article." "
On the other hand, aesthetic functionality is present if the design feature "affects
' 5
the cost or quality of the article." "
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision inQuaitexexpounded on the Inwood
standard of functionality, adding that a design feature is also functional "if
exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputationrelated disadvantage.""' 6 The Inwood and Qualitex standards should be applied in
order of announcement; thus if functionality is established under Inwood, the
Qualitex formulation is never reached.'"
Courts look to a number of factors as evidence of functionality." 8 The CCPA
identified four areas of evidence (the Morton-Norwich factors) for determining

108 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992).

"0'
Weinberg, supra note 104, at 5.
'10 See, e.g., Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904) ("In the absence of protection by
patent, no person can monopolize or appropriate to the exclusion of others elements of mechanical
construction which are essential to the successful practical operation of a manufacture, or which
primarily serve to promote its efficiency for the purpose to which it is devoted.'); Flagg Mfg. Co.
v. Holway, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (Mass. 1901) (holding the defendant had the right to copy "the
plaintiff's instrument in all essential and many non essential details").
I"' RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OF TORTS § 742 (1938).
112 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.10 (1982).
113 Weinberg, supra note 104, at 9.
114 Id.
115 Id.

116Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
117 Weinberg, supra note 104, at 25.
11 SeeInreMorton-NorwichProds., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (statinganumber
of positive and negative factors are available to aid in the determination).
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whether a product feature is ineligible for trademark protection vis- -vis the
functionality doctrine. 9 Courts are to examine:
(1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the utilitarian
advantages of the design; (2) advertising materials in which the
originator of the design touts the design's utilitarian advantages; (3)
the availability to competitors of functionally equivalent designs;
and (4) facts indicating that the design results in a comparatively
simple or cheap method of manufacturing the product. 20
21
An expired utility patent is considered heavy indication of functionality. 1
Additionally, information contained in the patent prosecution history can provide
valuable insight as to whether the design feature is functional.Y As noted by the
Federal Circuit, patent law is the appropriate vehicle for protecting useful product
features, thus the Court will place heavy emphasis on an expired patent."
Concern for the effect of trademark protection on consumers, however, "is
really the crux of the matter.' 24 As the Supreme Court has emphasized,
"[c]onsumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition."' 25 The cost
of alternative designs is considered in determining functionality because granting
trademark protection when other available options are cost prohibitive essentially
26
With
grants the trademark owner a monopoly over essential design aspectsY.
respect to taste marks, and consumable foods specifically, certain flavors are more
likely to be considered functional because there is a substantial demand for them
in the marketplace.2 2 An example given by two commentators is illustrative:

119 Id. at

1340-41.

Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing MortonNorwich, 671 F.2d at 1340-41).
121 SeeTrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23,29 (2001) (holding a dual-spring
120 Value

design that was previously protected by a utility patent is functional, and thus cannot be protected);
see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119-20 (1938) (holding the pillow-shape of
the shredded wheat biscuit was dedicated to the public after the expiration of the patents, thus the
shape was not eligible for trademark protection).
1 Weinberg, supra note 104, at 45.
123 Value Eng', 278 F.3d at 1273.
124In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
12 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).
'z See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973,980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971)
("The basic policy which forbids the allowance of a trademark in functional features of a product
is the policy to encourage and protect free and open competition."); Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119 (holding
trademark status cannot be granted to extend a monopoly over the "pillow" shape of shredded
wheat biscuits).
27 Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 27, at 800-01.
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[A]n unusual flavor-like melon or caramel or peanut
butter-added to a toothbrush or dental floss would be more likely
to be protected than the same flavors for cookies or bread if food
manufacturers would be more likely to have a competitive need for
flavors than those who make dental hygiene products.'

3. Likelihood of Confusion. A mark that is likely to cause consumer confusion
is not eligible for trademark protection. 9 This principle ensures that mark
owners can profit from the goodwill of their brand, a core purpose of trademark
law. 3 ° Trademark owners thereby have an incentive to invest in their brand,
providing higher quality goods to consumers.' 3' Congress codified the likelihood
of confusion doctrine, stating "[n] o trademark... shall be refused registration...
on account of its nature unless it [is] ... likely, when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.' 132 'The likelihood of confusion standard for registering a trademark is
33
also the standard required to prove trademark infringement.
But what constitutes "confusion"? Two types of confusion are identified in
43(a) of the Lanham Act: (1) "confusion as to 'affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person' "; and (2) "confusion as to 'the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person.' "134 Prohibiting consumer confusion protects the
"ordinarily prudent" purchaser by eliminating any possible misunderstanding
about the source of a product. 3 Additionally, producers are encouraged to invest
in the goodwill of their brand because imitators will be prevented from infringing
136
and creating confusion in the marketplace.

128 Id. at

801.

,29 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006); Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion:
TrademarkPoficies and FairUse, 50 ARiz. L. REV. 157, 157 (2008).
130 Austin, supra note 129, at 158.
131 id
132

15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006).

133

Seeid. § 1125(a)(1)(A) ("Any person who... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,

or device... which is likely to cause confusion ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.").
134LYDIA PALLAS LoREN &JOSEPH ScoTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES &
MATERALS ch. 5, pt. 3, at 2 (Semaphore Press 2008), available at http://www.semaphorepress.com/
IntellectualPropertyLawoverview.html.
135 Austin, supra note 129, at 157-58.
136 Id at 158.
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Likelihood of confusion is a fact-based inquiry. 3 ' The CCPA has created a
multi-factor test for determining whether the challenged mark creates a likelihood
of confusion among consumers in the marketplace. 38 The factors to be
considered are:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. (2)
The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as
described in an application or registration or in connection with
which a prior mark is in use. (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of
established, likely-to-continue trade channels. (4) The conditions
under which and buyers to whom sales are made ....(5) The fame
of the prior mark ....(6) The number and nature of similar marks
inuse on similar goods. (7) The nature and extent of any actual
confusion. (8) The length of time during and conditions under
which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion. (9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not
used .... (10) The market interface between applicant and the
owner of a prior mark ....(11) The extent to which applicant has
a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods. (12)
The extent of potential confusion ....(13) Any other established
fact probative of the effect of use.'
These factors are to be judged in combination, but "[n]ot all factors are
necessarily relevant in every case, and in some contexts, particular factors may be
given more weight than others.""' The core factors are similarity of the mark, the
defendant's intent, the proximity of the goods, and the strength of the plaintiff's
mark. 4'
One example of a confusingly similar mark is the electric clock at issue in
MastercraftersClock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constanlin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.'42

137 Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 162 F.2d 280, 283 (1st Cir. 1947) ("[U]lnmate
question of likelihood of consumer confusion as to source is one of fact.').
138 In reE.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
139I1; see also
6 MCCARTHY, supra note 11, § 24:30 ("[E]ach of the 13 federal circuit courts of
appeal has developed its own version of the list and each appears to be jealous of its own
formulation of factors."); Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581,1582 (2006) ("[Flinding] significantvariation among the [thirteen]
circuits in the application and outcome of their respective tests.").
40 Austin, supra note 129, at 169.
141 Beebe, supra note 139, at 1623-38.
142 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955).
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Vacheron manufactured and sold the Atmos clock, which had a "distinctive
appearance and configuration.' ' 4 3
Mastercrafters soon thereafter began
distributing the Model 308 clock that was designed to imitate the appearance of
the Atmos.'" The Second Circuit held that "plaintiff copied the design of the
Atmos clock because plaintiff intended to, and did, attract purchasers who wanted
14
a 'luxury design' clock. 1
Consumer confusion can occur at many points in time. 46 Initial interest
confusion occurs when consumers mistakenly believe that the junior user's
product is endorsed by the original mark holder prior to purchase.'47 Point-ofsale confusion occurs when "consumers initially are attracted to the junior user's
mark by virtue of its similarity to the senior user's mark, even though these
consumers are not confused at the time of purchase."'"
Finally, post-sale
confusion happens when "customers are confused as to the source of the junior
user's product when this product is observed in the post-sale context."'4 9
4. GraphicalRequirement. Although trademark registration is not required, it
is discussed because of the many benefits it provides.5 0 A trademark applicant
is required to submit a "clear drawing of the mark" when the application is filed
with the USPTO for registration. 5' Two types of drawings are identified: (1)
"standard character (typed) drawing," and (2) "special form drawing."'' 2 The
standard type drawing is irrelevant in the context of a flavor mark because it only
applies to marks consisting of "words, letters, numbers, or any combination
thereof."' 53
The special form drawing, on the other hand, applies to shape marks, color
marks, and motion marks.' For example, applicants seeking to register shape
143 Id. at
144

465.

id

141 Id. at

466.

See Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 537 n.2 (2d
Cir. 2005) ("The Lanham Act protects against several types ofconsumer confusion, includingpoint-ofsak confusion, initialinterest confusion, and post-sale confusion .... " (citations omitted)).
147 Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
148

Id.

149

Id. at 515.
See In re Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cit. 1999) (noting the

'50

Lanham Act requires only use in commerce, not federal registration to seek protection of a mark,
though registration affords substantial benefits not found in the common law (citing In re Beatrice
Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1970))).
"' 37 C.F.R. § 2.52 (2009).
152 Id.
13 See id. § 2.52(a) ("Applicants who seek to register words, letters, numbers, or any combination
thereof without claim to any particular font style, size, or color must submit a standard character
drawing that shows the mark in black on a white background.").
1- Id. § 2.52(b).
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marks are required to submit a special form drawing that "must depict a single
rendition of the mark" and indicate the three-dimensional nature in the
drawing.' 5 Color marks require a depiction of the color and identification of its
name 156 -the PANTONE color is acceptable, but the common name is also
7
required.'1
All trademark applications must include a written depiction of the mark to be
registered. 5 Representing the trademark graphically allows the USPTO to
publish the mark for opposition and provides notice to other potential applicants
about the scope of the rights held by the mark holder. 9 Despite its importance,
the graphical requirement is not easily applied to the representation of a
nontraditional trademark."6 In response to the increase of nontraditional
trademark applications, federal law provides that "[a]n applicant is not required
to submit a drawing if the mark consists only of a sound, a scent, or other
completely non-visual matter."'' For sound, scent, and other non-visual marks,
the applicant is not required to submit a drawing with the application; instead, a
62
"detailed description of the mark" must be included.
III.

ANALYSIS

Putting aside the fictional lawsuit against Coke Zero, Coca-Cola does not have
a persuasive argument to sustain a trademark infringement action against other
cola beverages for taste infringement. The flavor of Coca-Cola likely does not
meet the requirements for trademark protection, preventing both registration and
an action for infringement. Identical flavors are fundamentally different from
identical word marks. 163 The taste of a beverage is likely functional, and thus, not
protectable within the trademark framework. Taste marks, like color, sound, and
scent marks, have peculiar characteristics that require tweaking the trademark

"s
156

Id
Id

2.52(b)(2).
2.52(b)(1).

157 Gilson

& LaLonde, supra note 27, at 794.

158 TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINATION PROCEDURE

§ 807, availabkathttp://tess2.uspto.

gov/tmdb/tmep.
159

Id.

o See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
16137 C.F.R § 2.52(e) (2009); see also In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639, 1640
(T.T.A.B. 2006) (stating the examining attorney accepted "[t]his trademark application is for an
orange flavor" as a sufficiently detailed description of the mark).
162 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (2009).
163 See In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1651 ("[I]t is difficult to fathom exactly how a flavor
could function as a source indicator in the classic sense, unlike the situation with other nontraditional trademarks such as color, sound and smell.").
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framework to enable future registration and enforcement actions.'" Although
Coca-Cola likely cannot protect its flavor, other taste marks may be able to do so
inthe future.
A. SOURCE INDICATION AND SECONDARY MEANING

For the Coca-Cola brand to successfully bring suit against other cola beverage
companies for taste infringement, it must first establish that the taste of CocaCola fulfills the first trademark requirement of source indication. 6 s The Supreme
Court has determined that source indication is found where the mark is inherently
distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.'66 The
flavor of Coca-Cola cannot be inherently distinctive because the flavor indicates
the particular product to consumers, rather than the source.
Similar to scent and color marks, protecting taste will require a showing of
secondary meaning. The taste of a cola beverage alone is not the same as an
arbitrary or fanciful word mark because it cannot automatically tell a consumer
what particular brand the product comes from on its own. The nature of a taste
mark "would seem to require sampling or smelling prior to purchase since the
goods and the 'sign' cannot be separated."' 67 Although consumers are unable to
sample the product prior to each purchase, the popularity of Coca-Cola suggests
that consumers not only identify the unique taste, but also enjoy it such that prepurchase taste testing is not required.
The Coca-Cola Company can likely establish secondary meaning for the flavor
of its namesake beverage because it has been produced for over one hundred
years and can be found in virtually every part of the globe. 6 ' Coca-Cola is the
"most popular and biggest-selling soft drink in history, and arguably the best
known product in the world."' 6 9 Over the years a number of formal and informal
taste tests have been performed to compare the taste of Coca-Cola to that of its
main rival, Pepsi Cola. 7 ° Known as the "Pepsi Challenge," this marketing

'" See Clarke, supranote 72, at 131 ('The extreme subjectivity of flavor perception would make
PTO examination of flavors-and any subsequent related litgation-difficult.'; supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
165See supraPart II.D. 1 (discussing source indication and secondary meaning as requirements for

trademark registration).
'" Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).
167Middlemiss & Badger, supra note 99, at 153.
16 The Coca-Cola Company Virtual Vender, http://www.virtualvender.coca-cola.com (last
visited Sept. 7, 2009) (view non-Flash version).
169 id

170See spra note 8 (explaining a blind taste test conducted with Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola to
determine which beverage consumers preferred most).
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promotion was designed to be a direct response to critical assertions that Pepsi
Cola and Coca-Cola tasted the same. 171 The Pepsi Challenge demontrates the
distinctiveness of Coca-Cola's flavor because consumers can discern the
difference between the two cola beverages, establishing the uniqueness of CocaCola's taste and secondary meaning.
Further, a court will likely find that the taste of Coca-Cola has achieved
secondary meaning because of the consumer outcry following the only flavor
change in the history of Coca-Cola. In 1985, The Coca-Cola Company changed
the taste of its signature beverage, coining the name "New Coke.' 1 2 Although
the new taste was preferred by customers in taste tests performed by the
company, "testing and research could not3 measure the emotional attachment
7
Americans had for the original formula.'
Loyal consumers were outraged over the variation from the original taste and
"New Coke" was quickly removed from the market.17 1 In retrospect, the
company noted "[the] original taste had become more than just a soft drink, and
consumers' deep feelings, memories and loyalties to it came alive.', 1 75 The failed
attempt to change the original flavor shows that consumers have come to
associate Coca-Cola with a particular taste, thus Coca-Cola can most likely satisfy
its burden of proving secondary meaning. Although most taste mark applicants
will have a difficult time proving secondary meaning, Coca-Cola occupies a unique
position based on its market presence that is not enjoyed by the overwhelming
majority of flavored items.
B. FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE

After establishing secondary meaning, Coca-Cola has the additional burden of
demonstrating that its flavor is not functional.'7 6 This factor is the difference
between a successful and failed lawsuit for taste infringement. Under the Inwood
formulation, Coca-Cola's taste is not aesthetically functional because the taste will
not essentially "affect[] the cost or quality of the article."' 7 The perceived quality
of Coca-Cola's product is likely affected most by defective packaging or expiration
of the product, rather than the flavor the company chooses for its beverage.

.71See supra note 8.
172 Coca-Cola Heritage, http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/heritage/chronicle.globaLbusi
ness.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2009).
173

Id

Id
Id.
176See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the functional bar to trademark protection).
177 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
174

175
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Although Coca-Cola's taste is not aesthetically functional, it is likely invalid
under the utilitarian functionality standard because the flavor "is essential to the
use or purpose of the article."' 78 Without its flavor, Coca-Cola would not be what
it is. Coca-Cola is consumed for enjoyment and refreshment; without its flavor
this objective could not be achieved. One commentator has stated, "if the smell
is the trademark, then there's not much of any value which is left when you
subtract the smell of the perfume from the product."' 7 9 The same principle
applies to Coca-Cola: if the taste is the trademark and the taste is removed from
the product, there is nothing left but flavorless liquid. The taste Coca-Cola seeks
to protect is essential to the enjoyment of the product, and thus it falls within the
Inwood standard for utilitarian functionality.
In addition to violating the Inwood standard for utilitarian functionality, the
taste of Coca-Cola is also a violation of the Quaitexstandard for functionality."i °
Allowing taste mark protection would "put competitors at a significant nonreputation-related disadvantage" because Coca-Cola would be granted a national
monopoly for the taste of its beverage.'
Consumers might prefer the specific
taste that Coca-Cola has over other variants in the same market simply because
they like the taste and not because it is Coca-Cola. This inherent preference for
one flavor over another is not connected to the reputation of a specific soft drink
bottler. Competitors wishing to produce a similar soft drink at a lower price will
be expressly prohibited from doing so if the trademark is granted. Because CocaCola's exclusive use of its unique flavor would put its competitors at a "significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage," the taste of Coca-Cola is likely functional
under the Qualitexformulation, prohibiting registration or enforcement.
The TTAB refused registration of the orange flavor mark in In reN.V. Organon
on the basis of functionality." 2 The TTAB reasoned that the orange flavor was
necessary to mask the taste of the medicine and make it more palatable so that the
helpful effects can be delivered." 3 The flavor of Coca-Cola, however, is
functional in a different sense. The sole purpose of Coca-Cola is for
consumption; the flavor is not meant to conceal any unpleasant taste, rather it is
required for the beverage to be enjoyable and refreshing.
Coca-Cola's attempt would probably fail the functionality prong ofthe analysis
because beverages, by nature, require a flavor. Commentators have posited that
non-consumable products are the most likely candidates for taste mark protection

178

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.

179Jeremy Phillips, Yeeuccc!, 161 TRADEMARK WORLD 66 (2003).

180See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 116 and accompanying text (this analysis is not intended to address any
protection of Coca-Cola's formula under trade secret law).
182 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
18 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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because there is no competitive need for those flavors. 1' 4 Consumers have certain
expectations of vanilla and cinnamon when it comes to the taste of a cola
beverage, thus, Coca-Cola should not be granted a monopoly on its particular
flavor, given the finite number of acceptable tastes within the cola beverage
marketplace. If this were a trademark suit, for example, over the taste of lickable
wallpaper, 8 ' the Coca-Cola Company would have a much stronger argument in
favor of protecting its product's taste because there is no competitive need for
specific tastes. Lickable wallpaper is a novelty item that can be used as a wall
covering with or without its flavor, thus the taste is likely not functional.
This same idea is reflected in the area of scent marks. The TTAB has
extended trademark protection of Plumeria-scented sewing thread and cherryscented race car exhaust, but has refused registration of scent for perfume,
cologne, and air freshener.'86 The scent marks that have been successfully
registered are nonfunctional, non-essential marks that display creativity and
ingenuity. 8 ' Coca-Cola's taste does not fall within this same category of marks
and likely will not be able to secure trademark protection.
Coca-Cola's taste is required for the product to provide refreshment and
enjoyment as intended by the manufacturer. Preventing other soft drink bottlers
from offering similar tasting beverages places Coca-Cola's competitors at a
"significant non-reputation-related disadvantage" because consumers might
simply prefer one taste over another. Because the flavor of Coca-Cola is essential
to its use and consumption, the taste is likely not eligible for trademark protection
because of the functionality doctrine.
C. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Coca-Cola, in its advertisements soliciting victims for taste infringement
lawsuits, suggests that consumers experience confusion because Coca-Cola and
Coke Zero taste strikingly similar.8 8 In evaluating a claim of taste infringement,
a court would look to whether the similar flavor of another cola beverage creates
a likelihood of confusion. If the taste of Cola X, for example, were so analogous
to that of Coca-Cola that it created consumer confusion in the marketplace, then
a likelihood of confusion would be established.

184 Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 27, at 801 ("An unusual flavor-like melon or caramel or

peanut butter-added to a toothbrush or dental floss would be more likely to be protected than the
same flavors for cookies or bread if food manufacturers would be more likely to have a competitive
need for flavors than those who make dental hygiene products.").
185 WILLY WONKA & THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY (Warner Bros. Family Entm't 1971).
186 Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 27, at 796-97.
187 Id
188 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Of the two types of confusion identified in the Lanham Act, Coca-Cola would
attempt to show confusion as to "the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person."'s Although
there are a number of factors that the court may consider in its fact-based inquiry,
the core confusion factors would probably be determinative.'" For purposes of
this discussion, assume Coca-Cola is suing Cola X, a hypothetical similar tasting
cola beverage, for taste infringement.
Coca-Cola's mark is very strong, especially given its vast popularity around the
globe. This factor favors Coca-Cola in finding a likelihood of confusion. The
two goods, Coca-Cola and Cola X, are in close proximity because they are
competing soda beverages bottled and sold in the United States, often next to one
another in grocery and convenience stores. This factor also weighs in favor of
Coca-Cola because there is a greater chance for confusion given the close
proximity of the goods in the marketplace. Further, the taste marks are very
similar in flavor, and thus more likely to confuse consumers. Finally, if the
defendant intended Cola X to taste nearly identical to Coca-Cola for the purpose
of exploiting Coca-Cola's customers, a likelihood of confusion will be found.
Each of these core factors, though not exhaustive, weigh heavily in favor of CocaCola, resulting in a likelihood of confusion with the taste of Cola X.
The confusion at issue is not initial interest confusion or point-of-sale
confusion.' 9' Although other cola beverages are shelved directly next to CocaCola in most retail locations, there is not likely to be initial interest confusion
because all beverages distributed by a particular bottler are typically kept together
in stores. Additionally, the packaging of Coca-Cola and other cola beverages is
not likely to cause point-of-sale confusion because Coca-Cola cans are red with
distinctive script.
The type of confusion that would support a taste infringement claim is postsale confusion; after purchasing and consuming a similar-tasting cola beverage,
customers are no longer sure what they are drinking. The problem with post-sale
confusion in this context is that in the typical scenario, the buyer knows that the
alleged infringer is the origin of the product.9 2 In the Coke Zero example,

See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
191See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (discussing the types of consumer confusion).
192 See, e.g.,
Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1243 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding
likelihood of confusion because the public is likely to be confused even though the individuals
purchasing look-a-like Ferraris from a different manufacturer at a significantly lower price were
informed that they were not purchasing genuine Ferranis); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645
F. Supp. 484, 493 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that even though the imitation watch was purchased for
$25 at a flea market with knowledge that it was not a genuine Rolex, likelihood of confusion is still
found because the watch is in commerce).
189
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however, consumers are unaware of the strikingly similar taste of Coke Zero until
after the purchase has been completed because beverages are consumed postpurchase. Preventing post-sale confusion is consistent with the purposes of
trademark protection because prohibiting confusingly similar taste marks allows
Coca-Cola to control its own goodwill and reputation.
Coca-Cola will likely be able to show that the flavor of similar tasting cola
beverages, like Coke Zero or Cola X, creates a likelihood of post-sale confusion
among consumers. This showingwill assist Coca-Cola in establishing a successful
claim for taste infringement.
D. GRAPHICAL REQUIREMENT

Although trademarks used in commerce can be enforced without registration
with the USPTO, Coca-Cola would likely seek to register the taste of its signature
beverage if the registration requirements could be met, thus triggering the
graphical depiction requirement.'93 Because the drawing requirement is relaxed
for other non-visual marks such as sound and scent, taste marks would likely be
exempt because flavor is a non-visual mark that cannot easily be depicted on
written
paper.'94 Coca-Cola would instead be required to submit a detailed
95
description of the mark in order to secure trademark protection.'
Capturing the flavor of Coca-Cola in a written description would be incredibly
difficult. The taste of Coca-Cola is more complex than the product flavor
described in Oqanon.'96 If Coca-Cola was allowed to use broad, simplistic terms
like "crisp," "refreshing," and "cola" in its written description, later enforcement
of the taste mark would be extremely problematic. The dilemma is that taste
transcends the English language, which fails to accurately capture the flavor using
a limited selection of finite words.' 97
Coca-Cola will likely be able to describe its flavor with sufficient detail to
satisfy the USPTO's graphical requirement, given its prior acceptance of "orange
Subsequent
flavor" as a written description of a potential taste mark.' 9
enforcement of the mark, however, will be very difficult based on the written
description because on paper, many of the colas on the market can be described
in virtually the same way.

193 See supra Part

II.D.4.

194 See supra Part II.D.4.
195

See supra note 161 and accompanying text.

196 See In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639, 1640 (TTAB 2006) (stating the examining

attorney accepted "orange flavor" as a sufficient written description of the taste seeking trademark
protection).
, See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
s See In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1640.
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E. TASTE MARK CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Taste marks present particular registration and enforcement problems for the
TTAB, courts, and mark holders. The taste of Coca-Cola is substantially
subjective, because a product's flavor is uniquely individual to the consumer. 99
A number of factors influence the way a taste is perceived and recognized by each
person: age, disease, and the temperature of the product." ° Because taste
perception is highly subjective, examination for registration and enforcement
proceedings would be troublesome.
The current procedure governing the registration of trademarks inadequately
addresses the recent proliferation of non-visual marks such as taste marks. The
classic requirements for trademark registration need to give way to a system
requiring more specificity and precision. Such a change would effectuate the goal
of trademark registration to provide notice, and prevent potential infringers from
unnecessarily expending large sums of money developing the same mark.2 '
These same problems are also present in the registration of scent marks. 2
Technological advances have lessened the subjectivity found in scent mark
registration. The USPTO could revise its procedures and require a sample of the
flavor to be deposited upon registration of the mark. Perhaps a technology could
be developed similar to the electronic nose to capture an objective representation
of the flavor.2"' An objective digital file digital file would greatly enhance the
ability of judges to determine whether a taste infringement suit has merit early in
the litigation cycle. Additionally, Coca-Cola could provide samples of its
trademarked flavor to those making requests through the USPTO. Although this
could be costly, and the product is available for purchase elsewhere, this will
provide notice to other potential applicants and likely deter would-be infringers.
IV. CONCLUSION

The idea of a lawsuit for taste infringement is a novel proposal, one which has
validity in the current trademark regime given the proliferation of nontraditional
trademarks. Upon closer look, however, Coca-Cola will likely not be able to
prevail against a similar-tasting cola beverage and secure protection for its unique
flavor.
199 See Clarke, supra note 72, at 131 ("The extreme subjectivity of flavor perception would make

PTO examination of flavors--and any subsequent related litigation-difficult.').
200 id

201See Supra Part II.A.
o22
See Churovich, spranote 72, at 313 ("[S]erious unanswerable questions will arise concerning
infringement [of scent marks].").
203 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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Taste mark protection is best suited for products not meant to be
consumed-where the flavor is not functional because there is no competitive
need for the taste. This same principle has been demonstrated in the denial of
protection for scent marks for products like perfume that consist entirely of a
particular smell. Without its unique flavor, Coca-Cola's hallmark beverage would
be valueless, thus the product flavor is functional.
Additionally, the current trademark regime is inadequate to address the
registration and enforcement of marks consisting entirely of taste. Mechanisms
will need to be developed to ensure that the subjectivity of taste and flavor
perception does not prohibit the registration and enforcement of valuable, and
otherwise enforceable, marks.
Finally, the trademark system is concerned with the ultimate benefit to
consumers by avoiding confusion and reducing search costs. Prohibiting
trademark protection for the taste of Coca-Cola's beverage will allow other cola
producers to create similar-tasting beverages without the fear of infringement
liability. Allowing market competition in the soda industry will greatly assist
consumers because they will get the benefit of lower prices, more choices, and
better quality.
Coca-Cola's fictional taste infringement lawsuit against the Coke Zero brand
is precluded by the functionality doctrine and inadequate registration and
enforcement mechanisms available for evaluating taste. Therefore, under the
current trademark framework, the "eerily similar house" that Coke Zero has
constructed will be allowed to stand alongside the Coca-Cola brand with no
recourse for taste infringement.
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